A dialectical view of morals
By Serge Kreutz
I do not only have a materialistic, but also a differentiated, ambivalent, and dialectical view of morals.
It contrasts sharply from what, in high philosophy, is the Kantian categorical imperative, and, in household philosophy, the golden rule.
Why should I not do to others what I do not want to be done to me? To do to others what one doesn’t want to be done to oneself is a common feature in everyday life.
Morals sometimes are strange constructs. Nevertheless, I can see a certain usefulness in having morals, especially sexual morals, enforced on others without wanting them applied on me.
Furthermore, I understand that moral prescripts have a specific function for people with limited intellectual capabilities.
Sexual morals demand that people be not overly promiscuous. Men ought not visit prostitutes, and women not become prostitutes. Fine with me, as long as these morals do not apply to my own promiscuity. Anyway, such morals are good for general sexual health, and reduce the field of competitors.
I do recognize that anti-sexual morals in many societies can be in my favor as long as long as these anti-sexual morals cannot be enforced legally on me and the person with whom, in whatever form, I am in a love relationship.
In such societies, if a large number of men are pious, they may withdraw themselves from the sexual competition. That suits me fine.
I would be a fool if I would not endorse restrictive morals for those other men, so they will keep their hands off the women I consider for myself.
Another aspect is that I want to live in peace. If a large number of the members of a society are non-violent for moral, even religious reasons, such a society will likely be less dangerous than a society in which there are few moral inhibitions to use violent means to achieve one’s ends.
As long as morals are not enforced as a disturbance to me, or the woman I am in love with, I can well accept them as the backwardness of a local population.