By Serge Kreutz
If current trends in sexual politics continue to impose themselves on human society, warlordism as a political system is a genuine possibility.
The idea that in the future, warlordism may be a common political system is based on the fact that current political systems are increasingly restrictive on the sexual freedom of men.
The restrictive trends are based on the solidarity of women to protect the market value of female sexuality in general, and the sexual market value of less attractive women more specifically. Claiming moral high ground and an alleged protection of the weak, concepts of restricting male access to female sexuality find entry unto laws and government policies.
By genetic design, male sexuality is polygamous. It is so because the highest propagation success of male genes is by fertilizing as many females as possible.
By contrast, female sexuality by genetic design favors monogamy. The highest propagation success is in binding one strong man as long as possible to protect her offspring.
That the political system of Western democracies puts strong emphasis on males conforming to monogamous standards becomes obvious when we observe what “failures” have the greatest impact on the political careers of men in North America or Europe. It’s not how they manage the economy, or even how they conduct wars.
It’s the degree to which they are monogamous. Be reminded that the most important issue during the Clinton presidency was whether or not he had sex with Monica.
So, then why warlordism?
When loopholes for forms of sexual contact that are not officially approved are closed, or secretive activities become impossible because society, especially rulers, are under constant observation, any violent social environment becomes an attractive option because in such a violent social environment, control is interrupted, and a sense prevails that anything can happen (also in the realm of sexual conduct). This, then, is freedom.
Warlordism is the fragmentation of countries and the establishment of zones that are ruled by warlords.
In such fragmented countries where zones are ruled by warlords, the upper classes of waring fractions typically enjoy many more liberties than they would in peacetime.
One of the principal errors in current political understanding is that political rulers ought to, and generally do, exercise their power for the benefit of those they rule.
This is, and always was, a lie.
The primary incentive why rulers want to be rulers has always been that to rule benefits the rulers. This is the natural state of social interactions, and it is hypocritical to profess otherwise.
Over the past centuries of democracy, it was easy for rulers to pretend that they were in office for the benefit of those ruled, when in fact, they ruled for their own sake. Because it was easy to pretend to rule for the sake of the public, those who ruled did not see any necessity to dismantle the stupid public dogma that those who rule ought to do so for the sake of those ruled.
Anyway, it was useful to pretend to rule for the benefit of those who were ruled as to some degree, it preempted dissent.
However, the transparency that now prevails in human society as a result of digital data processing capabilities negates most of the behind-the-scene benefits that those who rule were able to enjoy even in political systems that demand that rulers rule for the benefit of those ruled, not their own benefit.
I do not believe that those who rule human societies will ever genuinely do so without expecting substantial benefit for themselves. This would be against the human nature.
Therefore, if political systems heavily restrict the benefits that rulers can garner for themselves, men who are potential rulers will consider other political systems, such as warlordism, rather than doing away with the idea that ruling has to benefit rulers.
Rulers, and their upper classes, have a lot to gain from social chaos in which they can establish themselves as warlords. Because during war (even the low-intensity-conflict kind of war), the upper classes of waring fractions are much less under control of those ruled (whose primary concern is not to get hurt or killed).
In the past, rulers would enjoy the most benefits from being rulers during peacetime. They therefore pursued peace.
But in an age where digital data processing establishes a high degree of transparency on peacetime rulers, and thus undermines the benefits they can reap in as rulers, chaos and the low-intensity-conflict kind of war become attractive alternatives for rulers and potential rulers.
Or political systems develop that afford rulers (men) genuine benefits from being rulers. These benefits do not have to be of the material kind but could as well be sexual (as in allowing polygamy, with rulers naturally having the greatest number of wives).
Anyway, the ultimate compensation for men in human society is not money, and not power for the sake of power, but sexual access and sexual satisfaction.
If this cannot be arranged, then it shall be warlordism.